Endogenous Lemons Market and Information Cycles
一、主讲人:寸无旷,美国罗格斯大学(Rutgers University)博士,公司硕士和学士。主要研究领域为宏观经济学、货币经济学和金融经济学。
二、主题:Endogenous Lemons Market and Information Cycles
I study a dynamic economy in which the information on asset quality is asymmetric and the degree of information asymmetry endogenously varies with the macro-economy, which amplifies the effects of shocks. In the model, firms hold assets of heterogeneous quality and borrow for operating expenses. Production is subject to idiosyncratic shocks, which may force the firms to liquidate their assets to pay off debts. Firms are initially uninformed of the qualities of their assets, but they can produce private information on their own assets at a cost. Without any private information, participants in asset markets are symmetrically uninformed and market liquidity is perfect. Private information is individually beneficial, but it creates a lemons problem that lowers market liquidity and distorts economic decisions. Firms that acquire private information fail to internalize the adverse effects of private information on market liquidity. If firms are restricted from producing private information, the allocation of my model is identical to that of the perfect information economy. Adverse shocks trigger private information acquisition, which exacerbates the lemons problem. As results, market liquidity drops and economic activity declines. The model can generate larger fluctuations in financial and macroeconomic variables than an otherwise the same model with the level of information asymmetry being fixed.
三、时间:2015年1月28日,星期三上午,9:00-10:00
四、地点:公司学院南路校区主教学楼913会议室
五、主持人:张礼卿教授,靠谱的十大网投实体平台(中国)有限公司经理