一、主题：Assessing the Determinants of Credit Rationing--Firm Level Evidence from China

二、主讲人：苟琴，北京大学国家发展研究院博士生，纽约大学经济系和斯特恩商学院访问学者。2009年获南开大学经济学学士。其主要研究领域包括：国际金融、宏观经济学。研究成果在Asian Economic Policy Review, China Economic Journal、《世界经济》、《金融研究》等中英文刊物发表。她的多篇论文还被清华大学—哥伦比亚大学国际经济学研讨会、NYU Conference on China’s Capital Markets、北京大学与斯德哥尔摩大学联合举办的“Inequality, Growth and the Middle-Income Trap in China”等国际高水平学术会议录用并宣讲。

三、时间：10月30日（周三），12：30—13：30

四、地点：公司主教楼913会议室

五、主持人：黄志刚，靠谱的十大网投实体平台(中国)有限公司副教授，经理助理

摘要：In this research, we investigate the determinants of credit rationing in China, taking full advantage of a firm level survey data from World Bank. In our identification mechanism of credit rationing, we not only exclude firms without bank loan demand but also classify credit rationing into two types: self-rationing where firms are discouraged to submit a loan application and bank-rationing where firms‘ applications are turned down by the banks. We apply the probit model with censoring to account for the potential selection bias problem caused by non-random nature of our credit rationed sample. We find: (1) Nearly half of the potential borrowers were credit rationed, of which about two thirds was due to self-rationing and one third was due to bank-rationing; (2) The reason for why SOEs seem to have advantage in obtaining bank loan is not purely due to the ownership superiority but that SOEs are mostly large in size and SMEs are more likely to be credit rationed than large firms in each measure (3)Firms with better profitability performance face lower likelihood to be rationed in each measure, while profitability is not important in bank‘s lending decision for SMEs; (4) Government‘s help in obtaining bank loans importantly influences bank loan allocation, which aggravates SME‘s disadvantage in formal finance as government provides more support for large firms; (5) Financial development helps more firms to obtain bank loans while it benefits SMEs only if financial marketization reaches a certain degree.